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We analyze a contest between two groups where group members have differing valuations for 
the contested rent. Generically the pivotal group member with the median valuation of the 
rent will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has preferences different 
to her own into the contest. The delegation can be either to more or less 'radical' group 
members. The direction of delegation depends on the order of moves and the relative 
'aggressiveness' of the group medians. We show that almost certainly very asymmetric 
equilibria arise, even if the median group members value the rent (almost) equally. Delegation 
can lead to a social improvement in terms of resources spent in the contest. 
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Over the last decades, starting with Gordon Tullock's (1980) seminal contribution, contests
have been intensely studied, not only in the economics literature but also in political sciences
and other related ¯elds. Contests have been used to model a wide array of situations of
con°icts, ranging from inter-state con°icts (see e.g. Gar¯nkel (1990)), over rent seeking (see
e.g. Nitzan (1994)), to promotion tournaments (see e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981)).
We start this paper with the observation that contests are often taking place between
groups and, in the light of this observation, allow explicitly for the possibility that the
members of these respective groups have di®ering valuations for the contested rent. This
seems quite natural: If a group of producers tries to in°uence lawmakers to create favorable
legislation, the value of this legislation is likely to be di®erent for di®erent group members.
As an example one might consider the market for agricultural products where the value of
a speci¯c legislation may vary greatly between large industrial farmers and small family run
farms.
If we allow for this intra-group heterogeneity, there is a con°ict of interests between di®e-
rent members of the group on how much resources to spend in the contest. We take a new
perspective on this by taking into account the fact that typically not all the group members
are actively participating in the contest, but typically groups assign delegates that act in the
contest on behalf of the whole group. In analyzing this delegation problem we assume that
the assigned representative will follow her preferences once she is in o±ce. In this respect our
analysis has very much the °avor of citizen candidate models a la Besley and Coate (1997)
or Osborne and Slivinsky (1996). We show that in our model the Median Voter Theorem
is applicable. Thus the delegate's assignment can be modelled as the median voter's choice
problem over di®erent delegates' types.
Our set up allows us to analyze under what circumstances radical appointees come into
power. The model predicts that in most situations of con°ict 'tough' types will interact with
1'weak' types and that it is rather unlikely that two opponents with the same degree of 'radi-
calization' meet. Initial di®erences in valuation between the median types in the respective
groups are vastly ampli¯ed. The initially more 'radical' median voter delegates to a much
more radical type whereas the initially less radical median voter accommodates by delega-
ting less aggressively. As a result with delegation the amount of 'waste', i.e. unproductive
e®ort spent in the contest, is generally lower than without delegation. Thus delegation can
be, from a social planner's point of view, a desirable feature.
Though contests between groups have been analyzed before, the previous literature had
a quite di®erent take on the issue. Baik et al. (2001) look at a situation where two groups
compete for a prize and each group member individually decides how much e®ort to exert in
the contest. They ¯nd a mixed strategy equilibrium in which only the most 'radical' group
member in the respective groups will be active in this situation. Konrad (2004) analyzes a
fully discriminating contest1 between two groups. After the prize has been allocated to one
of the two groups, the members of the winning group internally have a contest to allocate
the prize amongst themselves. The outcome depends on inter- and intra-group heterogeneity,
and is not driven by free-rider incentives. Other than in our model it is not the median group
member that is key to the results but the general heterogeneity within a group.2
Also the issue of strategic delegation in the context of contests has been analyzed. Dixit
(1987) shows that agents have locally an incentive to commit to exert higher e®ort in a
contest. However he remains silent about how this commitment can work and points out
that the speci¯c channels of commitment should be analyzed in depth. We present one
possible way to do this and o®er a full analysis. Baik and Shogren (1992) build on Dixit
1In a fully discriminating contest the contestant spending the most wins the prize with certainty.
2Dijkstra (1998) and Schoonbeck (2004) also analyze situations of con°icts between groups. They base
their analysis on the assumption that joint surplus is maximized. Schoonbeck (2004) focuses on the e®ect that
with increasing group size it becomes more pro¯table to have just one agent acting in order to overcome the
free rider problem in providing rent seeking e®ort within the group. Dijkstra (1998) makes strong assumptions
on contractibility and focuses on the question how agents will support the acting agent in his e®orts in the
contest.
2(1987) and endogenize the order of moves. They can show that the \underdog" always wants
to move ¯rst whilst the \leader" is happy to wait for his time to come. However, here we
come to a di®erent conclusion: In our framework both types would want to be the ¯rst mover.
Baik and Kim (1997) analyze a model where the players in a contest can hire agents
that are more 'able', i.e. who's e®ort in the contest has a higher return. These agents can be
o®ered (exogenously given) incentive contracts. They ¯nd that there will be never delegation
to a less able player. Although their results di®er from ours qualitatively, the fact that the
initially more radical player hires a more able agent is revocative of our result that the
initially more 'radical' median delegates to a more radical representative.
Contests are closely related to all{pay{auctions3. But whilst all pay auctions are a spe-
cial case of fully discriminating contests, we look at not-fully discriminating contests, i.e.
the party spending more is not with certainty the winner. Konrad et al. (2004) analyzes
delegation in ¯rst price all-pay auctions. In their model players can hire other agents to bid
for them in the all-pay auction. The agents are incentivized with contracts and they ¯nd
multiple asymmetric equilibria in this initially symmetric auction game.
The analysis of delegation problems has a long tradition in the political economy literature.
Agents often want to delegate certain actions to other agents that have preferences di®erent
to their own as the latter are able to commit to carry out certain actions at a future point
in time. This logic is very similar to the one used in our argument. A prominent example of
this literature is Barro and Gordon`s(1983a, 1983b) model of monetary policy. In their model
a central banker faces a time inconsistency problem as his incentives are altered once the
private sector has formed its expectations over future in°ation. It turns out that the optimal
solution is to delegate the monetary authority to a conservative and independent central
banker who will never use monetary policy as a macroeconomic stimulus. Similar incentives
work in capital taxation. Before capital is accumulated, politicians have an incentive to
promise low tax rates. Once the capital is accumulated politicians have clear incentives to
3Baye et al. (1993) and Hilman and Riley (1989) are examples of applying all{pay{auctions to lobbying.
3tax the capital contrary to their past promises. Political economy equilibrium models show
that medians voters ¯nd it optimal to delegate the taxation authority to a politician that
possesses more wealth than they do as the wealthier person can commit more credibly not
to overtax the capital4. Whilst in these two examples delegation is used to overcome a time
inconsistency problem our model focuses on the strategic value of delegation in situations of
con°ict.
Besley and Coate (2003) analyze centralized versus decentralized provision of public goods
and show that for centralized public goods provision the delegates in the districts are strate-
gically chosen such as to maximize the expected return from the negotiations on the federal
level. This is close in spirit to Chari et al. (1997) who analyze the congressional split ticket
voting behavior in the U.S.. They ¯nd that the states are more inclined to vote for demo-
cratic politicians to go to congress as they are expected to ¯ght harder for transfers to the
states from the federal government.
Our paper relates also to the game theoretic analysis of arms races. If one interprets the
groups as nations, the resources as military expenditure and the rent as a foreign policy
issue, our model can be seen as a model of arms races. We allow for this interpretation as we
believe the model can explain in a simple way several features of arms races. For example
Oren (1994) ¯nds that the spending pattern of the con°icting parties in the Indo-Pakistani
con°ict over Kashmir matches the results of our model. High expenditures by one side are
matched with low expenditures of the opponent. Oren (1992) ¯nds the same feature in the
US and USSR military spending during the cold war era.
Finally, there is a relation to the social psychology literature on group polarization. Social
psychologists, cf. eg. Teger and Pruitt (1967) or Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969), have found
that group decisions are distorted towards the extreme with respect to the initial preferences,
where the direction depends on the group members initial preferences. Our model could be
applied to gain better understanding of the processes within groups that lead to this outcome.
4See Person and Tabellini (2000) for a comprehensive treatment of this literature.
4The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two introduces the basics
of the model. We then derive personal preferences over delegate's types and show that the
median voter theorem can be applied. In section four we look at a simple version of the
model where only one group has to appoint a member that carries out the contest activities.
This simpli¯ed version already gives us valuable insights into the mechanisms at work. In
section ¯ve, we look at sequential delegation decisions, in section six the same is done for
simultaneous delegation decisions with asymmetric and symmetric group medians respec-
tively. In section seven we look at social welfare by comparing aggregate waste, i.e. total
resources spent in the contest. Section eight discusses some extensions. Finally, we conclude
in section nine.
2 Basic Model
To ¯x ideas consider two countries A and B that quarrel about a foreign policy issue. Assume
this issue can be captured by a rent R: First these groups simultaneously have to appoint
each a politician to act on their behalf. Then, after observing the representatives' types,
these politicians then have to decide how much of a given budget bA, in country A, and bB,
in country B, to spend in the contest. Finally the rent is allocated. There is no asymmetric
information in the model.
The citizens of the two states may have di®ering valuations of the rent R. The valuation
of the rent of citizen i in country A is ®iR; i.e. ®i can be seen as the weight placed on the
foreign policy issue. ¯jR is the respective valuation for citizen j in country B. ®i and ¯j are
continuously distributed according to the distribution functions fA(®i) and fB(¯j) within
each group. The only restriction we put on the distribution functions is that they have to be
bounded on (0;®] and (0;¯] respectively, i.e. there exist most 'radical' types ® and ¯. The
0 is excluded to avoid technical problems.
An integral part of the model is the contest success function (CSF) g(mA;mB) that de-
5termines the probability of winning the contest for a contestant dependent on the resources
spent by him, mA, and the opponent, mB. To model the contest we use a Tullock style contest
success function
mA
mA+mB: Our results would hold for all 'constant returns to scale' contest
success functions, i.e. functions of the form
µmA
µmA+¼mB that are homogenous of degree 0. See
the Appendix 10.1 for an exposition with a general constant returns to scale contest success
function. We assume g(0;0) = 1=2. To ease the exposition we focus on Tullock's initially
proposed function
mA
mA+mB. As we stick to risk neutrality throughout one can interpret this
not only as the winning probability but also as being the share the country secures for itself.







+ (bA ¡ mA)







+ (bB ¡ mB):
This states that utility is increasing in the (expected) rent and decreasing in the resources
spent by the country in the contest. This cost ¡mi with i = fA;Bg can be considered as the
foregone public good which is produced with a simple linear production function from the
exogenously given budget bi with i = fA;Bg not spent in the contest. Alternatively think
of the contest expenditure ¯nanced by a equal per-capita-tax. We assume for now that the
budget restrictions are never binding and neglect them in the course of this analysis. We will
discuss these issues in our Extensions section where we also introduce heterogeneity in the
cost of provision of the public good.
We proceed from here by ¯rst deriving the equilibrium of the contest stage dependent
on the politician's types. Then we use our results to derive in the next section the citizens'
preferences over politicians' types.
In the contest stage the two agents i (for country A) and j (for country B) in charge


















+ (bB ¡ mB)
From the two ¯rst order conditions of this problem we can solve for the reaction functions
mA =
p
mBR®i ¡ mB and mB =
p
mAR¯j ¡ mA
and the equilibrium values of m¤
A and m¤














They depend only on the politicians' types and on the size of the rent under consideration5.
It will be useful in the further analysis of the model to note some properties of these




@®i > 0 and
@(m¤
B)
@¯j > 0: It is increasing (decreasing) in the other politician's









> > > <
> > > :
> 0 if ® > ¯
= 0 if ® = ¯










> > > <
> > > :
> 0 if ® < ¯
= 0 if ® = ¯
< 0 if ® > ¯
It facilitates intuition of our results later on to note already here how these equilibrium
values for mA and mB behave in the limit with respect to the acting politicians' types. The
equilibrium contest spending does not go to in¯nity if the politician's valuation of the rent
goes to in¯nity, but is bounded. If the politician's valuation of the rent goes to in¯nity the








5Note that for ®i = ¯j = 1 , i.e. the situation analyzed by Tullock (1980) the values not surprisingly boil




73 Individual Preferences over Politician Types
This section uses our results from above on the contest stage game to derive individual
citizens' preferences over politicians' types. From above we know the equilibrium values of














Now we are interested in the question what kind of politician ®P a citizen i would like to
send into the contest, taking country B's politician choice ¯P as given. Would he want to
act himself or would he want to have a politician with a lower or higher valuation ®P than
his own to act on his behalf?

















Using our results for m¤
A and m¤

































< 0 . Thus we can clearly see that delegation decisions of the countries
are strategic substitutes. This is an interesting observation in itself as it is in the analysis
of contests seldomly the case that such a clear{cut case on strategic substitutability or





Figure 1: Reaction Function for one-sided delegation
ĮM
ĮM
Note that in the case where country B's politician has exactly the same valuation as the
country A citizen under consideration, ¯P = ®i, this country A citizen prefers to act himself,
®P¤ = ®i.
Due to technical properties of the contest success function the country A citizen would like
to delegate to a politician with a negative valuation for cases where he is confronted with a




M)). As we restricted the type
space to positive valuation types we can show that in all those cases the utility of citizen i
is strictly increasing in ®P (see Appendix 10.2) and thus he wants to delegate to the most
radical type ®. This leads to a vertical piece in the reaction function (see Figure 1). Thus




2¯M¡®M < ® and by ®P¤ = ®
otherwise.
In order to analyze the delegation problem we proceed now by showing that in our context
the Median Voter Theorem (MVT) is applicable.
Following Black (1948) we know that in any one dimensional policy problem the median
9voters most preferred policy choice will win any pairwise vote over any other policy candidate
if the agents exhibit single peaked preferences over the policy choices.
First note that we deal with a one dimensional policy problem, as the question at hand is in
the end what amount mA to spend in the contest. As we have shown above the decision how
much to spend corresponds one to one to the decision which delegate to have in the contest.
Now for the Median Voter Theorem to be applicable we have to show single peakedness.
There is a one-to-one mapping from the spending decision to the type decision as any pair





and the functions for
mA and mB respectively are strictly increasing in the politician's type. Thus we focus only
on the decision over types. Above we derived the reaction function in the delegate's type
space for an arbitrary group member. Now we show that the utility has a unique peak on
this reaction function for any group member for any given delegate type of the other group.
The optimal value of ®P for an arbitrary country A citizen i is given by ®P =
®i¯P
2¯P¡®i: The















Thus we know that
sgn(
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Now plugging in k
®i¯P
2¯P¡®i for ®P and checking for k < 1 (below the reaction function) and
k > 1 (above the reaction function) gives
sgn(
@u




@®P ) = ¡1 for k > 1:
Thus, as needed for single peakedness, utility is strictly increasing in ®P below the optimal
choice and strictly decreasing in ®P above the optimal choice. As argued above for the vertical
part of the reaction functions where the optimal choice of ®P is restricted by ® utility is
strictly increasing until ® . Single peakedness is therefore automatically ensured and the
Median Voter Theorem is applicable.
Lemma 1 Given the one dimensional policy problem with single peaked preferences we can
analyze the delegation problem as the median voter's optimization problem.
4 One-sided Delegation
A natural starting point for the analysis of the delegation decision is the situation where only
one country delegates. Without loss of generality we restrict our analysis to the case where
country A has this option. An interpretation of this situation would be that the population in
country B has homogenous valuation of the rent or that in country B institutional features
hinder delegation.
In the case of one sided delegation we only have to closely inspect the above derived
reaction function of country A's median voter ®M. As shown above his valuation determines
country A's delegation decision. To ease exposition we assume without loss of generality that
in country B the median type acts in the contest.
Proposition 2 In the case of onesided delegation the optimal delegation decision depends
solely on the type of the median and on the type of the other country's acting politician. The




2¯M¡®M < ® and by ®P¤ = ® otherwise.
11A closer inspection of this reaction function tells us more about when country a wants to
delegate to more radical or less radical politicians.
Proposition 3 If ®M < ¯M the median group member prefers to send a group member that
values the rent less than him into the contest ( delegation to a less aggressive type).
If ®M > ¯M the median group member prefers to send a group member that values the
rent more than him into the contest ( delegation to a more aggressive type).
If ®M = ¯M the median group member prefers to act himself in the contest, i.e. ®P¤ = ®M.
Here we already see the basic logic of delegation at work. Delegation leads to an ampli-
¯cation of initial di®erences which makes the actual contest more asymmetric. We will use
the insights from this simple case in the analysis of what follows.
5 Sequential Delegation
Now we allow both countries to decide which citizen to send into the contest (two sided
delegation). We ¯rst look at an analytically simpler situation in which country A has to
appoint its politician before country B does. In what follows we refer to this case as sequential
delegation.
We solve the problem by backwards induction and ¯rst have a look at country B 's problem








+ (bB ¡ mB):
Using our results for mA and mB and deriving the ¯rst order condition we get the by now





2®P ¡ ¯M :




2®M¡¯M < ® and
by ¯P¤ = ¯ otherwise.
Anticipating the behavior of the country B median and the behavior of the politicians the








+ (bA ¡ mA)
Using the equilibrium values of m¤
A , m¤














As can be seen easily, utility strictly increases in ®P. Thus it is optimal to choose ®P¤ = ®.
This means that it is optimal for the country A median to delegate the negotiations to the
most aggressive group member, irrespective of his relative aggressiveness as compared to
country B's median.
Plugging this into ¯M 's best response function we get ¯P¤ =
®¯M
2®¡¯M .











. For ® ! 1
we ¯nd that ¯¤
b converges to
¯M
2 . This result is independent of whether the ¯rst or the second
moving median is more radical.
This result deserves some consideration for several reasons. First of all, it tells us that
the result in the delegation case will be more pronounced then the one in standard contest
models. While standard models of contests predict also asymmetric equilibria for symmetric
players in a sequential situation, the model of delegation in contests predicts extremely
asymmetric equilibria in its sequential version.
13Second, the model gives us a clear prediction of the way in which the asymmetry works:
The country that is able to appoint a politician ¯rst has a ¯rst mover advantage as the
appointment of a politician presents a fait accompli to the second country. Namely, the
¯rst country will use its ¯rst moving advantage in order to delegate to its most radical
member, thereby making ¯ghting for the rent more costly for the other group. Consequently,
in equilibrium the share of the rent (and the utility for the median type) the ¯rst moving
country can get will be signi¯cantly greater than the other country's share (see Appendix
10.3). This holds as long as ® is su±ciently large, namely ® > 2¯M. I.e., as long as delegation
is a powerful instrument it ensures an advantage. The result is particularly striking for groups
that are absolutely identical.
Note that our result that both countries prefer to have the ¯rst moving advantage contra-
dicts Baik and Shogren's (1992) result that the 'underdog' (in our case the median of the
country with the less aggressive median) wants to move ¯rst whilst the 'top dog' happily
waits for its turn.
6 Simultaneous Delegation
We now look at the situation where the medians delegate simultaneously. Using the above
derived equilibrium values of the ¯nal stage game we can solve for the best reply functions
of the median types in the type space.
The problem of the median voter in countries A and B respectively is to choose a politician
















+ (bB ¡ mB):
14We can use the equilibrium values for mA and mB and derive the ¯rst order conditions










2®M¡¯M < ¯ and ¯P¤ = ¯ otherwise for country B.
These functions have an interesting property. They are symmetric around the bisecting
line. And, if one neglects for a moment the restriction that ®P¤ < ® and ¯P¤ < ¯, we can
see that for ®M = ¯M , i.e. perfectly symmetrical countries, they coincide for positive values
of ®P¤ and ¯P¤. If however ®M 6= ¯M they do not intersect at all, i.e. there does not exist
an equilibrium in pure strategies. We will treat those cases separately.
6.1 Simultaneous Delegation - Asymmetry
We start with the generic case where countries' medians di®er in their valuation, i.e. ®M 6=
¯M . Without loss of generality we focus on the case where ®M < ¯M . In this case we
can use our above derived results and ¯nd that the unique intersection of the best response
functions is given by the point where ¯M delegates to his most radical option, ¯P¤ = ¯ ,
and ®M accommodates by choosing ®P¤ =
¯®M
(2¯¡®M) . It is interesting that we get this result
of extreme polarization independent of the di®erence in the median types, i.e. initially only
marginal di®erences are drastically ampli¯ed and lead to very asymmetric equilibria.
Proposition 6 If countries are asymmetric, i.e. ®M < ¯M (w.l.o.g.), there is a unique
equilibrium characterized by ¯M delegating to ¯P¤ = ¯ , i.e. as radical as possible, and ®M
accommodating and delegating to ®P¤ =
¯®M
(2¯¡®M) . This polarization is independent of the
degree of the countries' asymmetry.
Note that even if country B can delegate very extremely, i.e. ¯ ! 1, we get country A






Figure 2: Simultaneous Delegation - Asymmetry
Į*
Note that standard models of contests predict asymmetric equilibria as well, if the con-
testants valuation of the rent is di®erent. It is easy to show however that in our case the
asymmetry will be more pronounced. Moreover, as one can see in Figure 3, even minuscule
variations in a country's (here country B0s) median voter (and thus shifts in the reaction
function) might lead to very dramatic changes in the Equilibrium (here from E to E0).
Note however, that the extreme nature of these equilibria depends on the restricted support
for ¯P¤ · ¯ . If we allow for unbounded support this equilibrium seizes to exist and we do
not ¯nd any pure strategy equilibrium (see Figure 4). As the strategy set in this case is
not compact we do not ¯nd a mixed strategy equilibrium, either. The intuition seems to be
straightforward. Because no matter how far we push ® out, the extremely asymmetric nature
of the pure strategy equilibrium persists. The very moment we go to the limit of ® ! 1 the
nature of the (mixed strategy) equilibrium would change non-continuously. However, as the
existence of an in¯nitely radical citizen seems to be not the empirically most relevant case
we neglect this particularity in the remainder of the analysis and assume that there exist












6.2 Simultaneous Delegation - Symmetry
In the non generic case where ®M = ¯M = ° countries are perfectly symmetric in terms of
the technological prerequisites and the preferences of the median citizen. As noted above, in
this case there exists a continuum of equilibria as the reaction function coincide (see Figure
4).
Proposition 7 For ®M = ¯M = ° a continuum of equilibria exists in the simultaneous
delegation game.
There is no a priori reason why one of these equilibria should have more appeal than the
others but we can compare them with respect to the utility country A's median receives in
them. From that we can see which equilibrium this agent would choose if he had the power




Figure 4: Asymmetric countries with unbounded support – no equilibrium
Įi
As a ¯rst step we write mA and mB as functions of ®P . Note that we replace ¯M and ®M













4®P . We can easily see, that this expression strictly increases in ®P and reaches a
maximum at ®P = ® .
Lemma 8 Country A median prefers most the equilibrium where he delegates to his most
radical option ® .
This result parallels the analysis of our sequential case where it was most desirable to be
the ¯rst mover and delegate as extreme as possible. Thus it seems hardly surprising that in







Figure 5: Simultaneous Delegation - Symmetry
7 Aggregate Waste under Delegation and No Delega-
tion
In this section we are going to analyze whether there is an e®ect of delegation on social
welfare. In the analysis of contests social welfare is measured by the resources that are
unproductively spent in the contest, i.e. the waste that is generated. We compare whether
aggregate waste di®ers in a situation where delegation is possible as compared to a situation
where the median type himself acts. The situation where the median voter acts himself is
the relevant comparison as we know that the policy suggested by the median voter would
win every election. We have shown above, that the Median Voter Theorem is applicable in
our context. So without the possibility to delegate we know that always the median voter's
most preferred policy would be implemented.
We show below that delegation has non-trivial e®ects on aggregate waste. This may imply
interesting policy implications for designing optimal contests as a social planner interested
19in reducing the amount of resources spent in contests can try to design the structure of the
contest such that groups are able or even forced to delegate.
7.1 Aggregate Waste with one{sided Delegation
We start with the situation where only one country, without loss of generality we again
assume it is country A, can delegate. Aggregate waste in the case of no delegation,WnD ,
can be written as
WnD = mA + mB = R
®M¯M
®M + ¯M :
From the equilibrium values for spending in the contest m¤










2 and from the equilibrium values for the acting politicians, ®P¤ =
¯M®M
2¯M¡®M and ¯j =






























+1 if ¯M ¸ ®M
¡1 if ¯M < ®M
We see that there is a reduction in aggregate waste whenever the country B median, who
acts herself, is more radical. The intuition is that country A by delegating in this situation
has the chance to back down and amplify the initial di®erence. By doing so the contest is
more biased and less controversial. If however the country A median is initially more radical
the di®erence is also more pronounced but the median in country B cannot back down by
delegating downwards. Thus the controversy is worsened.
207.2 Aggregate Waste with Sequential Delegation
Without loss of generality we again assume it is country A that delegates ¯rst. Recall from




Using the equilibrium values of m¤
A and m¤
B and recalling the results of delegation, ®P¤ = ®
and ¯P¤ =
®¯M






























+1 if ¯M · ®M
¡1 if ¯M > ®M
:
The intuition is that if the right, i.e. the initially more radical, country can move ¯rst, the
asymmetry is increased and delegation works the right way and reduces waste. If it is the
other way the more radical B median delegates too radical in response to ®P¤ = ® and there
is too much haggling.
7.3 Aggregate Waste with Simultaneous Delegation with asym-
metric Medians
Without loss of generality we again assume ®M < ¯M:Thus we know ¯P¤ = ¯ , and ®P¤ =
¯®M
(2¯¡®M) and we can derive Wnd = R®M
2 : Wnd we know from above:















This leads to the following proposition.
21Proposition 9 Simultaneous delegation leads to social improvement due to a reduction in
aggregate waste in the case of asymmetric countries.
Again this result is due to the (by delegation extremely pronounced) asymmetry of the
equilibrium.
7.4 Aggregate Waste with Simultaneous Delegation with symme-
tric Medians
Here we compare all equilibria with respect to the aggregate waste. To do so we again express
mA and mB as functions of ®P and ¯P and use the fact that ®M = ¯M = °. Thus we get for
the aggregate waste mA+mB = R
°
2 which is constant over all equilibria. Intuitively, as there
is no initial di®erence to be ampli¯ed delegation apparently looses its bite in the symmetric
case.
8 Extensions
8.1 Heterogeneity with Respect to the Cost of Public Good Pro-
vision
Again looking at the median citizens' problems we can allow for di®ering e±ciency cA and cB
in providing the public good. A higher value for cA or cB expresses here a higher opportunity
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Now performing comparative statics with respect to the e±ciency of public goods pro-
vision, cA and cB , leads us to conclude that an increase in the e±ciency of public good
provision, e.g. better developed infrastructure, leads to less radical delegation, i.e. an inward
shift of the best response function, and thus has the same e®ect as a lower valuation of the
median citizen:
@®P¤
@cA = ¡®M¯P cB®M
(cB®M¡2cA¯P)
2 < 0 and
@¯P¤
@cB = ¡¯M®P cA¯M
(cA¯M¡2cB®P)
2 < 0:
Proposition 10 Better developed countries tend to delegate less radical.
8.2 Group Composition
One question to ask is whether there are incentives to a®ect the composition of groups. To
do so we analyze the median voter's utility and see how it is a®ected along two margins: The
identity of the median voter and the most extreme type.
Without loss of generality we focus again on the case where ¯M > ®M holds. Thus the
equilibrium politician types are given by ¯P¤ = ¯ and ®P¤ =
¯®M
(2¯¡®M). Using ®P¤, ¯P¤,m¤
A,
and m¤











































> 0 as we assumed
¯M > ®M: For uM
A the results are clearcut
@uM
A




The following proposition summarizes these ¯ndings.
Proposition 11 The initially more radical country B median voter would like to reduce the
other country's median voter type even further and would like to be able to delegate to an
even more radical group member itself. The initially less radical country A median voter's
incentive regarding group composition are the exact opposite.
The exact interpretation of these derivatives will di®er depending on the speci¯c appli-
cation at hand. In some circumstances we can interpret this as countries competing for the
group members with the strongest preferences for the rent. Suppose ® > ¯, then country B
has two advantages from attracting ®: On the one hand ¯ increases and on the other hand
®M decreases. These two e®ects soften the con°ict by amplifying the asymmetry and thus
increase B0s utility.




@®M , has to be carefully interpreted, as increasing ®M almost by de¯nition
has to increase the median voter's utility as it directly increases the valuation of the rent and not only has
an indirect strategic e®ect.
248.3 Financing of the Budget
We assumed so far that the spending in the contest is ¯nanced with an equal per capita tax.
Now suppose that the ¯nancing of the contest spending is done by a tax that increases in
the citizen's valuation for the contested rent. In this situation delegating to a more radical
politician loses its commitment power, as the more radical politician is less inclined to ¯ght.
The reason is, that ¯ghting hard for him is now relatively more expensive then for a less
radical politician. As we have seen above the loss of delegation as an instrument may be even
from a social planner's perspective be bad as aggregate waste increases. This might be one
of the reasons why many policies are ¯nanced from a general budget and not on the basis of
valuation dependent fees.
8.4 Budget Restrictions
We have argued above that spending in the contest strictly increases in the politician's type.
If we invert the argument we can state that delegation helps the median to commit to a
certain level of spending. From this point of view a budget restriction has the same e®ect as
the existence of a most radical type in a country.
We can distinguish between two cases. If the budget restriction of the less radical country is
binding there is neither a qualitative nor a quantitative e®ect as this is as if the most radical
type of this country is reduced. But in equilibrium this has no e®ect. Only if the budget is
really low there may be a quantitative e®ect as the country has to back down even more
then it initially intended. If the budget restriction of the more radical country is binding
it is again as if the most radical type in this country is reduced. This has an immediate
quantitative e®ect as the median can de facto not delegate as radical as he wants. There
is also a qualitative e®ect as soon as the 'e®ective' most radical type is su±ciently small.
Then the initially less radical but richer country can exploit the fact that the more radical
25but poor country cannot exercise its higher desire to win the contest. In this context Rajan
and Zingales' (2000) ¯nding that ex-ante (e±cient) trades might not happen in the face of
potential con°icts down the road has relevance also in our context. If a trade is mutually
bene¯cial but might increase budgets su±ciently to spur con°ict later on the fear from the
¯ercer contest to come might hinder trades from taking place.
9 Conclusion
This paper presented a model of delegation in contests. We have shown that the equilibria
that tend to arise seem to be characterized by a high degree of asymmetry. This can be due
to two factors. In the sequential game, the asymmetry was simply due to the ¯rst mover
advantage in the delegation game. Using this advantage, the ¯rst moving group could secure
itself a higher share of the expected rent. Even, in the simultaneous game asymmetry is
almost certain to arise although for di®erent reasons. Here we found that a median group
member that is only slightly more radical than her opponent in the other group will decide
to give the active role in the contest to its most radical and aggressive member. The other
group's median accommodates by delegating to a rather moderate politician. Thus initial
asymmetries are ampli¯ed by delegation. Further we showed that delegation in contests
implies by its asymmetry that less resources will be spent in the contest than under non-
delegation.
If one is willing to go some way in interpreting our model one could interpret the US
electing the hawkish Ronald Reagan in 1981 being followed by dovish Mikhail Gorbachev
coming into power in the USSR in 1985 as being consistent with the predictions of our
sequential model. Next to this, admittedly anecdotal, evidence we would like to stress that
the main implications of our model are in principle testable. Our model identi¯es not only
the circumstances under which the median group member will be decisive, but although
to whom he wants to delegate the decision and what resource spending in the contest this
26implies. Finally, our model predicts extremely asymmetric spending of both groups in the
contest.
It appears to be that the reasoning applied in this paper can be fruitfully enriched and
applied to other issues. As well in the ¯eld of public choice as in other ¯elds such as Industrial
Organization. Baye and Hoppe (2003) explored the conditions under which contests and R&D
competitions are strategically equivalent. Consider a situation where two ¯rms compete in
two di®erent markets. By hiring a CEO who is, e.g. due to private bene¯ts, clearly in favor
of one of the markets (thus more inclined to spend money on R&D in this market) the
two ¯rms can avoid intense competition on both markets and both secure themselves their
market with barely challenged monopoly rents. An example of a somewhat related reasoning
for intra-¯rm con°icts can be found in Rotemberg and Saloner (1995).
10 Appendix
10.1 Derivation of Reaction Function for General Constant Re-
turns to Scale Contest Success Function
Utility of country A citizen is
uA = ®iR
µmA
µmA+¼mB + (bA ¡ mA)
and utility of country B citizen is
uB = ¯iR
¼mB
µmA+¼mB + (bB ¡ mB):






























The problem of the median citizens in countries A and B is given by
max




+ (bA ¡ mA)
max




+ (bB ¡ mB)



























which are qualitatively equivalent to our formulation. Thus our results hold for this more
general formulation, too.
10.2 Derivation of the Reaction Function








the optimality is shown by checking that left of the reaction function,
i.e. for ®P < ®i®P
2®P¡®i utility is strictly increasing in ®P:
The derivative @u




























Left of the reaction function it holds that ®P = k ®i®P
2®P¡®i for k < 1:





= +1 for k < 1:
For ¯ 2 (0; ®i




























Now we check for ¯P < ®i
2 ; i.e. ¯P = k ®i















As utility is strictly increasing in ®P it is optimal to choose in these cases ®P = ®:
10.3 Utility Comparison in the Sequential Move Game
Without loss of generality we assume that the country A politician moves ¯rst. From the
analysis we know that ®P¤ = ® and ¯P¤ =
®¯M
2®¡¯M:
29The utility of the ¯rst mover is (after using our results on mA and mB) given by
uA =
R®M ¡





The utility of the second mover is (after using our results on mA and mB) given by
uB =
R¯M ¡




Now use ®P¤ = ® and ¯P¤ =
®¯M
2®¡¯M and assume bA = bB = b:























For ® su±ciently large, i.e. ® > 2¯M; this is always true.
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